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ABSTRACT 
 
Today, the Republic of Karelia forms part of the western border of European Russia, and 
is home to the Green Belt of Fennoscandia (GBF), a highly biodiverse landscape of forests and 
watersheds. The Karelian Government is especially invested in the forestry industry owing to the 
rurality of the region and the economic necessity of these enterprises. Taking an Actor-Network-
Theory approach, this thesis looks at changes in Russian forestry overall, with a particular focus 
on their social implications. Qualitative examples from the Republic of Karelia, a densely-
forested western region, will be utilized to show how the Forest Codes of 2007 and the process 
of certification have drastically changed the actors and networks available in forestry and their 
surrounding communities. Originally forestry settlements were a simplistic chain of networks, 
tying industry and the community to the forest. With privatization and a growing interest in the 
certification process, local actors are now enrolled in a complex web of transnational actors and 
networks, which are themselves shifting and transforming.
  iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...…......1 
Actor-Network-Theory…………………………………………………………………...…….3 
Forests and Forestry in Karelia and Russia………………………………….…………..……..5 
Koivuselka: An Example of the Challenges of the Post-Soviet Period……………….………..9 
Forestry Networks, Forestry Actors in Russia……...………………………….……………….11 
Impact in the Karelian Forest: Reforms……………...……………………………….……...…15 
Social Implications and Consequences for Forestry Industries………………………………...17  
Certification and Corporate Social Responsibility.…………………..…………….………......21 
CSR and Certification in Russia……………...…………………………………….…...……...25 
Discussion and Conclusion……………………………………………………………….….....31 
References…………………………………………………………………………………...….34
1 
 
Introduction 
Historically important to both Sweden and Finland, in 1920 the region of Karelia was 
established as Finland’s border with Russia when the then-new nation state cemented its borders 
with the Peace of Tartu (Anssi Paasi 1997). This treaty was intended to strengthen and build 
Finnish statehood, yet it remained incredibly porous in regards to travel and trade. Soviet Karelia 
was established in the 1920’s after the Russian Revolution and was considered “West Karelia” 
by most Finns, versus the Finnish spaces east of Lake Lagoda. Originally named the Karelian 
Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, the Republic of Karelia saw an influx in Finnish 
immigrants, traversing the border for work and an enchantment with communist ideals. This 
started a succession of events, leading to the eventual Winter Wars (1939-1940) and the 
subsequent Continuum Wars (1941-44) in which the Soviet Union quickly annexed the east of 
the region causing the displacement of more than 400,000 Finnish and Karelian peoples (Anssi 
Paasi 1997). The boundary dispute was 
concluded and cemented with the Treaty of Paris 
in 1947 (Anssi Paasi 1997). This divided the 
region, leaving Finland only the western areas 
(now the maakunnat, or provinces, of North and 
South Karelia).  
This was a favorable result for the 
Stalinist Soviet Union, both for political reasons 
(a hefty land grab which would not only 
strengthen a still-fledgling Soviet Union ravaged 
by war and famine, but would also act as a 
military foothold in the Arctic) and for economic 
Figure 1. “Map of Karelia Today” Snowdog. 2005 
2 
 
reasons: Karelia boasted rich natural resources in the way of timber. Today, the Republic of 
Karelia forms part of the western border of European Russia, and is home to the Green Belt of 
Fennoscandia (GBF), a highly biodiverse landscape of forests and watersheds. The Karelian 
Government is especially invested in the forestry industry owing to the rurality of the region and 
the economic necessity of these enterprises. Nearly 56% of residents in Karelia are dependent on 
the forestry industry (Ulybina 2010, Kortelainen and Kotilainen 2003). 
  Taking an Actor-Network-Theory approach, this thesis looks at changes in Russian 
forestry overall, with a focus on their social implications. Qualitative examples from the 
Republic of Karelia, a densely-forested western region, will be utilized to show how he Forest 
Codes of 2007 and the process of certification have drastically changed the actors and networks 
available in forestry and their surrounding communities. Originally forestry settlements were a 
simplistic chain of networks, tying industry and the community to the forest. As this thesis will 
show, with privatization and a growing interest in the certification process, local actors are now 
enrolled in a complex web of transnational actors and networks, which are themselves shifting 
and transforming.  
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Actor-Network-Theory 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) describes the agency and power of actors (objects, 
animals, materials, humans…) in their creation of networks. This creation occurs through 
interaction; we live, according to ANT, in a world of radical interconnection. For Latour (2005), 
such interactions—associations or entanglements—enable distinct, disparate actors to become an 
actant—not a character, something separate from and superimposed upon a background, but an 
integral element —in the corresponding network. Crucially, ANT ascribes equal power and 
agency to the human and the non-human. Non-human agency derives from a material's ability to 
modify a state—for example, the tools used in constructing a house, or a mug used for drinking. 
The non-human, for Latour, is not merely a backdrop, and nor does it simply determine human 
space by delineating its borders. Rather, the non-human, just like the human, influences and 
interacts with what surrounds it. The world is thus co-created and fundamentally contextual: 
nothing can be taken in sterile separation from its milieu. The world is a network of networks, 
and each network is comprised of countless actants. 
 Latour (2005) writes that an actor is anything that can alter a situation. Each actor in a 
network is engaged in a wide array of unstable relationships in which actors consistently 
influence each other. As actors enroll new actors into their networks, the spaces between them 
become places of power, creating agency. This space transcends literal geography, as technology 
allows for distances to be traversed transformatively, such as a video or phone call. Power and 
the integrity of a network is a process. Power is gained, lost, and regained following the actor’s 
successful ‘translation’ (Callon 1986) (Latour 2005). This ‘translation’ is a four-step process 
(Callon 1986):  
1. the identification of a problem and following dependency, 
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2. proposing and filling roles for resolving the problem, 
3. the enrollment of an actor into a network and securing their role as an actor, and 
4. the mobilization of respective entities that represent the network collective. 
 
 The networked relationships between actors, then, should not be considered universally 
stable, long-term, or obvious. We may catch a glimpse of such momentary associations—in 
studies of innovation, in breakdowns or accidents; in fiction—but ANT cautions us against 
taking the part for the whole. As Latour has noted (2005, 2014), when objects are not in use they 
fade into the background—despite their integral roles.  
 Historically, in political and economic analyses of forestry, the forest itself has tended to 
fade into the background (Busch and Juska 1997). The non-human is, of course, silent, and thus 
easy to overlook. Cloke and Jones (2002)—who borrow heavily from Latour and ANT in their 
determination of the non-human agency of trees and the forest—remark that trees exude agency 
by being non-passive and transformative in their environments. Trees are able to exist, flower, 
fruit, and season without human interaction. This ability allows trees to rearrange space and relay 
the temporal. However, in the case of forestry and forestry enterprises their role as an actor is 
much more complex. Indeed, the forest is integral in creating the very networks necessary to 
sustain the rich and multi-layered human concept of forestry. The industry, human society, 
political offices, and legislation that develop around forestland create a network which empowers 
the forest and grants it the agency to shape other actors and their corresponding networks.  
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Forests and Forestry in Karelia and Russia 
Forest management in the Russian empire began in 1798 under Emperor Paul 1. The 
principles established at that time would set the tone of modern discourse concerning forestry 
and the ownership of forestland (Filiptchouk, Strakhov, et al 1998). For much of its history, the 
region of Karelia was covered with dense taiga, and was ill-suited for the nascent forestry 
industry, which relied on infrastructure such as roads and sophisticated machinery. The first 
developments were sawmills, which were sparsely scattered across the region. This geographical 
territory was not heavily utilized for forestry until Soviet Karelia was established in the 1920’s. 
After the establishment of Soviet Karelia, regional leaders dictated and directed forestry 
initiatives. The period of rapid industrialization following the implementation of Lenin's New 
Economic Program (NEP; 1921-8), and the switch, under Stalin, to central planning, allowed for 
further investments in Karelia’s forestry resources and their ability to serve domestic and export 
needs (Piipponen 1999). This not only established plans to fulfill domestic needs but also offered 
economic opportunities: the Soviet Union needed the hard currency that came from exporting to 
neighboring European countries (Piipponen 1999). North and Solecki (1977) note that as of 
1977, the Soviet Union contained nearly 60% of the world’s softwood forests. It was, according 
to North and Solecki (1977), one of the few countries capable of fulfilling global lumber 
demands. The inefficiency of the forestry industry, however, seriously hampered the growth of 
timber as a primary Soviet export. At most, forestry exports and products (chip board, paper, 
pulp) represented 3% of the Soviet Union’s GDP by 1977.   
 In the case of Stalin's Five Year Plans, forestry was an area that was consistently 
neglected and mismanaged. While it was suggested that the USSR further modernize and 
prioritize forestry production, timber was largely considered a less secure export investment than 
6 
 
natural gas and oil due to global market demands (North and Solecki 1977). Despite some 
regions of the USSR failing to meet their production quotas, the forests of the north-west 
continued to be overcut, providing the greatest amount of timber fell. In 1972, the region of 
Karelia alone was responsible for 13.9% of sawn timber exports, 10.2% of round timber, and 
14.9% of paper — second only to Arkhangel’sk (36.4%, 9.6%, 48.0%, and 35.6%, respectively) 
(North and Solecki 1977). 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the economic reforms of the 
transitional period saw Russia move from a central-planning system to privatization. In the case 
of forestry, Russia lost both land and exporting power as close ties with the newly-independent 
former Soviet republics were severed. Standards of living fell significantly during this period, 
and those working within forestry and isolated areas of industry were particularly affected 
(Filiptchouk, Strakhov, et al 1998, Ulybina 2014). The shift to privatization caused the loss of 
more than 90,000 forestry jobs. The ongoing decline in numbers of forestry workers was 
remarkable: from nearly 2 million employees in 1976 to barely 800,000 in 2006 (Ulybina 2013). 
Further, it was not only jobs that were lost in the transition out of the centrally-planned economy. 
The Soviet state had provided a number of safety-nets, allowing the forestry industry to build a 
social infrastructure for local communities. With the move to privatization, this too was lost 
(Ulybina 2013).  
Russia itself boasts 23% of the world’s forest resources (Shvidenko and Nilsson 2003). 
Nearly 70% of Russia is forested area, growth that is considered “the lungs of Europe” 
(Richardson et al, 2009). The Republics of Karelia and Komi, along with the western regions of 
Arkhangel’sk, Murmansk, and Vologda, contain nearly 10% of these reserves (Piipponen 1999). 
The forests of North Western Russia consist primarily of coniferous species, mostly pine and 
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spruce (Litvin 2001). Official figures released in 2013 state that some 14.5 million hectares of 
the Republic of Karelia's 14.9 million are forestland. 69% of this is considered fellable forest, 
consisting mostly of marketable softwood and boreal timber (Official Karelia, 2013).  
According to Mayer et al. 
(2005), raw and processed timber 
materials from Russia are priced at 
just 10% of European prices. The 
reason for this is structural. The 
price of wood in European 
countries include the infrastructure 
necessary to produce lumber products 
(roads, processing, etc). In the case of Russian wood, these things are seemingly not included in 
the market price value. However, entry into the World Trade Organization has allowed for lower 
taxes and tariffs on forestry products making for easier trade. The fall of the ruble in 2014 
allowed for unprecedented growth in uncut lumber as well, by further lowering the market price 
of Russian timber. Unprocessed lumber and logs form a large part of Russia’s timber exports, 
amounting to nearly 2820.60 million USD in 2015 (Trading Economics 2016). China and 
Finland are both countries that import considerable amounts of logs from Russia and process 
domestically (Mayer et al 2005).  
Forestry enterprises in Russia practice clear-cutting in succession, uniformly cutting 
lumber by species within an area. This has led to cutting around old-growth forests and low-
value species such as aspen, causing intense losses of highly-sought after species of timber. 
Clearcutting promotes a monoculture and even-age forest stand, wiping out a plethora of same 
Figure 2 " Russian Timber Semi-Truck "  Druschba 4. 2014. 
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species and same-aged trees. Clearcutting is also responsible for a loss of top soil (hindering 
growth) and extreme impacts to the dependent eco-system, such as wildlife and watersheds.  This 
mechanism of forestry allows for low levels of regrowth and forest regeneration and has been 
considered a blatant act of deforestation and attributing to climate change.  
Mayer et al (2005) note that these forestry patterns will continue to create a loss of 
average forest maturity and the diverse patchwork integral to maintaining a healthy forest 
ecosphere. They further note that Russia loses 3% of its forestland reserves annually to 
overcutting (Mayer et al 2005). As the demands for wood products increase in Russia’s 
neighboring countries, so does the increasing legislation and domestic concern with conservation 
and biodiversity preservation (Mayer et al 2005). Effectively, those countries that import Russian 
lumber are outsourcing their environmental damage. The further deforestation and hyper 
utilization of forestland again confirms its agency within networks; those intertwined through 
subsisting, managing, and legislating will find themselves renegotiating their roles with the 
process of its regeneration. This is not only true for Russia, but for any economy reliant on 
natural resources. 
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Koivuselka: An Example of the Challenges of the Post-Soviet Period 
 Located 150 km from the Karelian capital of Petrozavodsk, lies the remote forestry 
village of Koivuselka (or Koivuselkä). It is located 40 km to the north-east of the shores of Lake 
Ladoga. Koivuselka was 
established as forestry 
settlement in 1949 but is now 
owned and operated by the 
private forestry enterprise called 
Shujales. Highly productive in 
the 1960’s, Piipponen (1999) 
notes that the forestry 
settlement harvested 700,000 
m3 of round timber annually. 
However, since the transition to privatization and change in the lumber industry’s mode of 
transportation (the rurality of Koivuselka means it lacks transportation infrastructure) the fate of 
the village is ambiguous (Piipponen 1999). Loss of infrastructure and decline in production 
caused an exodus of laborers and the surrounding population. In a matter of ten years, nearly half 
the population had fled Koivuselka. 
The lack of work and denizens has meant that industry has stopped investing in 
Koivuselka. The services in the village have either ceased entirely or become contracted to other 
private corporations. The significant loss of these services is demonstrated by Piipponen (1999), 
who notes that after privatization only one source of groceries and a food kiosk remained. The 
municipality became in charge of the usual social services provided by the state: schools, 
Figure 3 Koirnoja is a nearby forestry settlement that has suffered a 
similar fate to Koivuselkai Valli, Ollipekka. 2014. "Koirinoja" 
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kindergartens, administration. But the most traumatizing effect of transition on Koivuselka has 
been housing. Housing was built for temporary living situations to support forestry laborers; 
when privatization occurred, these homes were in such dilapidated conditions that they were not 
attractive candidates for becoming privatized themselves. They remained in the custody of the 
previous forestry enterprise, which while removing itself from the workings of the village, also 
removed itself from their maintenance. 
 Denizens of Koivuselka base their livelihood on agricultural initiatives and forestry 
products, such as berries and mushrooms. With crumbling infrastructure and the absence of 
maintenance, Koivuselka lacks running water and toilets aggravating the very real pressures of 
poverty and rurality (Piipponen 1999). While Koivuselka is an extreme example of forestry 
settlements in the transition era, it’s a very real example of the effects of privatization. The 
remainder of this thesis examines the post-Soviet period of privatization in more detail, and the 
several additional transitions and actors that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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Forestry Networks, Forestry Actors in Russia 
         The major body of forestland management was until very recently the Federal Forestry 
Service, which originated in the 1990’s along with the eventual Forestry Code of 1997. Prior to 
the further reforms of the 21st century, the Federal Forestry Service was not only responsible for 
drafting legislation but coordinating regional and international cooperation (Piipponen 1999). 
The first Forestry Code, put into place in 1997, established that despite the rapid advance of 
privatization, forestlands were expressly the property of the state. According to the code, lands 
that were rich in resources, called lesnoy fond or 'forest resources’, were to be controlled and 
operated by the Russian Federation.  While these places remained available for public use 
(recreation, mushroom hunting, spiritual enjoyment), there were now a number of regulations 
governing the utilization of their resources (Filiptchouk, Strakhov, et al 1998). If an enterprise 
was looking for raw materials in an area of lesnoy fond, they were now required to apply— and 
pay—for rights-of-use, to acquire short-term or long-term leases, or to appeal for a concession. 
The Forestry Code Reform brought new challenges but failed to eradicate previous ones. Illegal 
logging, theft, and corruption were still prevalent forms of forestry misuse (Kozyreva 2008). As 
forestry enterprises worked with outdated technology and dilapidated infrastructure, they faced 
increasing challenges with securing the raw materials necessary for production. 
        In signing such a lease, an enterprise agrees to conform to the regulations set out by the 
regional bodies of the Federal Forestry Service. Lease-holders tend to be subject to strict 
contractual terms, in which they are obligated to preserve the surrounding ecosystem and 
waterways (Filiptchouk, Strakhov, et al 1998, Nysten-Haarala 2013), as well as demonstrate their 
willingness to engage with and invest in local communities. The Forestry Code thus promoted 
the rational use of forestland, emphasized the importance of careful forest management, and 
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biodiversity (Ulybina and Fennell 2012), and provided some social protections for workers and 
communities. 
The Forest Code of 2007 radically changed the way forestry in Russia operated. 
Definitions of forest-use expanded, allowing for the clear-cutting for developmental 
opportunities. 2007 legislation markedly rerouted from conservation and protection to instead a 
utilitarian approach; intended to kindle the forest industry and entice forest industry investors. 
This has been one of the most criticized aspects of the reform alongside the cementation of 
auctions (Karpachevskiy 2008). The Forest Code of 2007 allowed for little to no input from lay 
persons and environmental NGO’s in its movement to expand the view of forest-use, changing 
previously held forest classifications, and recategorizing protected forestland as an exploitable 
resource. Alongside this was the mortgage of forestland, which has previously been unheard of, 
due to natural resources being specifically owned by the federal government. The regulation 
bodies and power that once remained regional, shifted to federal, including their profits, 
furthering the hurt felt by smaller forest municipalities. The Forest Code defines the larger 
government organs as in control of most forest functions, but only vaguely, if at all, mentions the 
subject’s and region’s administrative responsibilities (Hitchcock 2011). Beginning in 2008, the 
previous forestry management units (leskhoz) were divided into lesoparks and forest districts 
(lesnichestvo), a move which heavily diluted the Federal Forestry Services' power and ability to 
manage. By consolidating and ratifying the majority of forestry management units, the 2007 
reforms stripped the organs of forestry industry of their previous ability to control and monitor 
forestland activities (Karpachevskiy 2008). The change-over of forest use compensation to 
federal instead of regional meant that regional bodies depended on subventions from the federal 
budget. Despite this, monetary arrangements and the networks of leskhozy continue to exist, 
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albeit in a vague and weakened form (Ulybina 2010). The lesnichestvo, however, are no longer 
able to carry out forest maintenance (such as wood salvaging and sylvicultural) (Karpachevskiy 
2008).  
As of 1999, auctions became an increasingly common means of attaining rights of usage. 
Until this point, auctions were a relatively rare phenomenon, with leases and short-term contracts 
effectively the only ways to acquire access to forestland (Piipponen 1999). Auctions were 
previously unheard of because of a lack of ability to quickly disseminate information through 
rural areas and a lack of interested parties (Piipponen 1999).  Auctions meant for a faster and less 
ensnaring process for incoming transnational corporations, which Russia was hoping to entice. 
This increase in auction sales offered enterprises—both local and international—a means of 
circumventing the lengthy and highly-regulated governmental processes stipulated in the 
Forestry Code and overseen by the leskhoz, the State Forest Committee, and the government of 
the republic. In 2004, the Ministry of Natural Resources attempted to end the problem of illegal 
logging and corruption by amending the procedures that allowed for purchase of land-use leases. 
The attempt to focus more on auctions as a way of procuring leases was intended to allow for 
more transparency versus the previous closed competition method that relied heavily on informal 
networks. Although the amendments were made to allow for more transparency, there was little 
actual enforcement. Forest-use leases could range from a period of 49-99 years, and was not 
allowed to be sold to other enterprises within this time, this however was commonly bypassed by 
use of informal networks and enterprise merging (Tulaeva 2014).  
Auctions continued to increase in popularity till the new Forest Code of 2007 essentially 
wiped the ability to purchase leases through other means. The Forestry Code of 2007 and its shift 
to auctions as a primary source of obtaining leases was also explained as a means of ensuring 
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less governmental corruption and bribery (Ulybina 2014).  The Forest Code of 2007 transferred 
lease agreements from a regional endeavor to the larger organs of the oblast. This left enterprises 
(especially small and medium sized ones) scrambling to use their informal networks to acquire 
leases in 2006, before the legalization of the code. Auctions are now conducted and organized by 
oblast-level natural resource committees and leskhoz, regional governmental bodies and the 
regional-specific leskhozy performing nothing more than administrative functions. The newer 
method allows for a break-down of barriers by those competing for forestland, access is strictly 
monetary and is bought at the highest-price. In order to win an auction, a bidder need only offer 
the highest amount of money. There is no requirement to demonstrate any commitment to 
preserving and investing in ecosystems, be they social or environmental. 
The new forestry code has been seen by the public, international actors, and activists as 
increasing entrepreneurial business practices and behavior, allowing regional discretion for 
protections but not the means.  The top-down policy also further alienates the disenfranchised 
forestry communities that are reliant on their surrounding forest land for sustenance (firewood, 
mushrooms, berries, hunting) (Ulybina 2012, Karpachevskiy 2008).    
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Impact in the Karelian Forest: Reforms 
 In Soviet Karelia, the existence of the coniferous forest allowed for the surrounding 
community to thrive. Soviet Karelia’s marked transition into a region of heavy forestry industry 
meant more than the mere fulfillment of quotas. Forestry management, enterprises, legislation, 
and social infrastructure were all derived from the forestland; meaning the forest as an actor 
maintained and created a complex system of networks. The forest’s resources dictated the 
availability of other resources, namely Karelia’s social infrastructure.  After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, this infrastructure become the responsibility of private industries (Ulybina 2013, 
Carlsson, Olsson and Lundgren 2000).  These industries were barely sustaining what remained of 
the local community. Employment dropped significantly (by almost 50%), forcing an exodus of 
skilled foresters and their families (Kozyreva 2008).  
 As we have seen, the 1997 Forestry Code allowed for short-term user rights or forestry 
leases of the lesnoy fond. In order for their bids to be competitive, enterprises had to take the 
place of the former state by providing social infrastructure. Bids were judged not only on 
financial terms, but also by an enterprise’s community work (such as donating to or providing 
kindergartens, housing, and food), or the business’s longstanding relationships with the local 
communities (Ulybina 2013, Kozyreva 2008). This system ensured a complex network of actors. 
The forest supports the industry, which in turn both supports the local community through 
employment and differing kinds of infrastructure, and relies upon that local community in order 
that their bids for land and livelihood might be successful. The whole system is bound together 
in reciprocal interconnection. This means that a community supported by forestry is necessarily 
beholden to the several regional offices directing regulations of the forest, who then are 
answering to the Federal Forestry Service in Moscow. The Federal Forestry Service has been 
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criticized as “out-of-touch” with the actual practices of sustainable forestry and their local 
communities. In the Republic of Karelia specifically, Gomskomles represented the highest 
regional authority. Before the Forest Code of 2007, forestry management and regulation was 
distributed across 38  state enterprises. The management of lesnoy fond reserves was executed by 
specialists and experts, lezkhoz (forestry service), that are to be reevaluated every 10-15 years. 
Other actors on the margins of policy were the forest districts (lesnichestvo), forest management 
compartments (uchastki), regional forest management (leskhozy) and forest tending plots 
(obkody). This system has however changed with the Forest Code of 2007, which has 
consolidated higher-up departments and diluted the use and power of regional ones, 
disenfranchising municipalities while empowering higher state organs (Karpachevskiy 2008).  
Before the 2007 reforms, the oblast committee, regional actors (such as the leskhozy), and 
Karellsprom, an incorporation of smaller-medium sized Karelian forest industries, organized 
auctions; these smaller enterprises are no longer represented in the process. Previously, closed 
competitions and negotiations relied heavily on the informal networks of actors and transfer of 
social capital (Tulaeva 2014). Forest industry actors were represented by their societal 
contributions. This drastically changed in 2007 with the new Forest Code. Auctions have 
completely replaced the previous system that ensured some sort of social obligation for the forest 
settlements and further alienated medium-size or small-sized forestry enterprises from taking 
root or continuing in Karelia.  
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Social Implications and Consequences for Forestry Industries  
 During the Soviet period, the centrally planned economy mandated a high level of state 
involvement in all aspects of socio-economic practice. With no concrete distinction between 
state and industry, the forestry industry was, effectively, a stand-in or proxy for the regional 
administration, providing social services and municipal infrastructure. Communities came to rely 
on industry to provide kindergartens, schools, libraries, health-care centers, shops, and forms of 
cultural and social enrichments (Matilainen 2013, Kortelainen and Kotilainen 2003). Cities that 
were otherwise rural and contained just one major provider of employment were especially likely 
to fall into this dependency structure (Kortelainen and Kotilainen 2003).  
 During the transition period, however, when the state and industry were decoupled, the 
new private enterprises did not take on the social responsibility of the state-administrated 
industries. In 1993, municipalities were pushed by federal mandates to overtake the social 
infrastructure in forestry localities (Nysten-Haarala 2013). The public sector was expected to 
shoulder these responsibilities and provide the social services which were lost, but most local 
administrations and municipalities lacked the experience, expertise, and economic security to do 
this. These new burdens also demand a fair amount of revenue which was no longer supported at 
a federal level. The new municipalities were expected to take on a social infrastructure with little 
to no support from the federal budget and a lack of regional tax revenue due to their rurality 
(Nysten-Haarala 2013). As Södor and Järvelä (2007) note, the liveliness of communities is 
dependent on access to housing and support of families via schools.  
 Forestry companies are usually the largest investors in the regions in which they operate. 
They are also, owing to the rurality of these regions, often the largest employer. The loss of 
central planning meant that forestry industries became responsible for securing their own 
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markets and investment capital. As enterprises began to privatize, some mills were able to offer 
their employees the option of purchasing shares in the company. For example, 80% of the 
Kondopoga mill in The Republic of Karelia is owned by its employees. These mills are more 
likely to continue to provide some social responsibility programs, despite the official transfer of 
these responsibilities to municipalities in 1993 (Matilainen 2013). However, the transition period 
saw a fair amount of forestry industries cease altogether their involvement in the communities 
which they had previously supported. This was due to a need to become more profitable and 
efficient following privatization: indeed, Piipponen’s (1999) survey of Karelian forestry 
industries in 1997 found that 77% claimed to be unprofitable.  
 Kortelainen and Kotilainen (2003) point to the marked contrast of transnational organized 
mills and those supported and owned by their local community. The transition period may have 
ended the expectation of industry--community support and relation, but the Kondopoga mill 
maintains an almost paternal relationship to its surrounding community. The mill is responsible 
for social clubs, various city infrastructure, and youth initiatives. It is also the highest employer 
in the area, generating 90% of the tax revenue for the city (Kortelainen and Kotilainen 2003). 
Kondopoga’s partneralistic care for its community is not only due to its employee-owned 
structure but Kondopoga Mill’s management have ascertained that “there are no alternatives” 
within the present social and political climate (Nysten-Haarala 2013). Kondopoga’s business 
contrasts significantly with the Svetogorsk mill, which pushed for the municipalization of social 
welfare. Foreign investors in Svetogorsk implemented transnational ideas of business and market 
standards, focusing instead on efficiency and forestry stweardship, rather than focusing on the 
surrounding community. Svetogorsk mill is still highly productive and, like most forestry 
industries in Karelia, the largest employer of its city. Despite trying to maintain a distance 
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between itself and the city administration, the Svetogorsk mill is still responsible for heating 
homes and some types of waste water management (Kortelainen and Kotilainen 2003).  
 Transnational and after-transition domestic enterprises with foreign investors are more 
likely to make short-term lease agreements. These companies are not considered “local”, as their 
goals are concentrated on exporting concerns and economic efficiency rather than maintaining 
the surrounding community and workforce (Södor and Järvelä 2007). Rental agreements and 
sub-leases before the Forestry Code of 2007 usually stipulated that enterprises play some role in 
maintaining the surrounding community, whether through the correct use of forestland, or 
through the provision of social infrastructure (Matilainen 2013). This particularly limited the 
opportunities for external investors to gain access to natural resources.  Consequently, potential 
new investors or enterprises have found that social obligations or voluntary donations to the 
surrounding community are imperative in securing actual contracts (Kozyreva 2008). Second 
generation companies have inherited the expectations of companies dating from the time of 
transition, and are thus subject to higher scrutiny. It is has been asserted that those enterprises 
with especially large social responsibilities will eventually be forced to fall in in line with the 
world market, meaning that their work maintaining roads and schools will lose priority (Södor 
and Järvelä 2007). The symbiosis of the forestry enterprises and their workforce and community 
is strained.  
 Those enterprises with longstanding community relations carried over from the Soviet era 
were better capable of obtaining agreements with the leskhoz. However, following the division of 
the leskhoz into lesoparks and forest districts (lesnichestvo) in 2007, the ability to “force” 
enterprises into socially supporting their community has been diluted. The former forestry 
management units were the actors most responsible for the community networks ostensibly 
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centered around the forestry enterprises. The disabling or neutering of these management units 
creates points of stress and tension, not only between the community and the forestry industry, 
but also in terms of the community’s relationship with its surrounding forestland. The leskhoz’s 
overseeing of forestry operations and enablement of leases and contracts ensured that some 
social and environmental obligations were met. Now that one crucial element of the network has 
been disabled, what remains is a loose collection of individual actors, previously mediated, 
incapable of connecting in a way that is constructive. We have the breakdown of a network: a 
system that has been radically disrupted, and yet is still expected to function in the same way that 
it always did.  
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 Certification and Corporate Social Responsibility  
 Corporate social responsibility is the investment of an enterprise into social and 
environmental well-being that usually transcends normal procedure.  Before privatization, 
Russian enterprises were in the unique position of providing CSR via their symbiotic 
relationships with their communities. The case of forest localities is especially striking because 
of their rurality and extreme examples of dependency. Belyaeva (2013) outlines corporate social 
responsibility in Russia as a business model developing only within the early 2000s.  
 The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries, an association of 
countries with emerging powerful national economies that are becoming powerful players in 
global markets, have had conflicting views on the importance of CSR. India and China have 
been especially vocal in their belief that CSR is an unnecessary Western construction (Belyaeva 
2013). Corporate social responsibility is now expected if a company is to pursue global markets 
and an avenue for maintaining a competitive edge, meaning that those not participating not only 
lose competitiveness but face barriers in forming economic relationships. In 1993, the Forest 
Stewardship Council as an organization came into fruition with 126 participants, including 
NGO’s, retailers, indigenous people, and forestry unions. FSC is a multi-level and multi-actor 
network, headed by a general assembly located in Germany and split into three divisions: 
environmental, social, and economic (Tysiachniouk and Henry 2015, Schepers 2009). The major 
stated goals of the FSC are to protect biodiversity, to promote economic and environmental 
sustainability, and to benefit the local community (FSC 2015). In the case of CSR via 
certification, the World Trade Organization endorsed the FSC, meaning that uncertified 
enterprises faced being locked out of global trade relationships (Schepers 2009). In the recent 
domestic case of Russia, forestry certification has become an expected practice for companies 
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who wish to acquire short-term land leases through auction (Ulybina and Fennell 2012, Keskitalo 
et al 2009).  Belyaeva (2013) notes that the necessity of CSR in global markets essentially 
demands companies to invest in environmental and social initiatives. Drivers in Russia for 
certification have largely been the Western market and profit. Western regulation, specifically 
the European Union, calls for timber products to be sourced sustainably and legally. Certifying 
Russian forestry enterprises both provides demonstrable legitimacy and also plays into the 
increasingly popular notion of “eco-branding” (Ulybina and Fennell 2012). Consumer eco-
consciousness has driven a market for transparency and sustainable practices. This “eco-
branding” allows for a larger profit through strengthening the price of the timber (eco-sensitive 
items are expected to be more expensive) and a renewed intense demand.  While “eco-branding” 
allows for a more conscientious consumer, there are problems of legitimacy that arise in the 
certification process. One example is the “chain of custody certification”, through which an 
enterprise that is certified for processing can use both uncertified and certified wood. FSC and 
PEFC, along with some smaller certification programs, allow for chain of custody certification. 
These products are still branded as certified, granted that enterprises follow some of the 
provisions outlined by the certifier in acquiring “sustainable” lumber. FSC’s stipulations are 
flexible versus the arduous certification process that requires enterprise take on specific cutting 
requirements, a social clause, and manufacturing regulations; it only requires that wood is not 
sourced from High Value Concentration forests, forests with GMOs, plantation forests, and 
wood harvested violating civil or indigenous rights. FSC’s chain of custody certification 
enrollment alone has risen 280% in the years 2007-2012, versus merely 65% of actual FSC 
certification (Schepers 2009, Bartley 2014).  
 The Russian perspective on CSR is peculiar in that, unlike other emerging BRICS 
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economies, Russia has recent historical precedent for honoring worker’s rights and health, and 
allowing for community enrichment. While Russia is following the trend of global enterprises in 
“socializing” business, its understanding of CSR remains different from other non-Western 
countries. The Russian attempts at CSR are negotiable, flexible, and non-systematic (Belyaeva 
2013). The rising necessity of CSR in creating global relationships unfortunately means that 
there is a rising chance of it becoming a superficial process. The interconnectedness of actors due 
to changing technology allows for markets and enterprises to face extreme scrutiny in the face of 
environmental and social missteps; however, the effects of and attempts at CSR are likely to be 
exaggerated when presented to the public (Belyaeva 2013).  
 While forestry certification builds on CSR initiatives, it also acts as a tool of 
multigovernance. As stated earlier, the market is enabling (and in some cases, forcing) actors to 
take part in CSR in order to establish economic partnerships. Forest destruction from illegal 
logging was one of the largest factors leading to the original creation of certifications in the 
1990s. The United Nations’ inability to approve an international forestry convention led to the 
market-based answer of certification schemes, which have been perpetuated by environmental 
NGOs (Bartley 2014). Certification schemes are a form of private governance; they are regimes 
that are not in debt to state policy, regulation, or enforcement. The reach of their governance 
includes both forest management itself and the perpetuation of consumer and investor demand 
(Schepers 2009, Nysten-Haarala 2013).  The increasing interconnectedness of business and 
society has meant there’s been distinct change from “government” to “governance”. 
Transnational corporations have historically been difficult to regulate at regional levels, 
perpetuating the necessity of private governance through certification schemes. Globalized 
markets also mean that some governments have decided to not regulate corporations in the 
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international sphere, and instead allow market norms to shape—and effectively decrease—
domestic regulations (Schepers 2009). While industry and its resulting relationships were strictly 
tied to the development of the nation state, globalization has created a growing trend in 
governance spanning transnational space. Transnationalization plays a key role in the resulting 
interplay of various actors, and the integration of political and economic forces which have made 
common supranational rules, regulations, and institutions a seemingly necessary component of a 
globalized market (Bartley 2014, Keune and Marginson 2013).  Schepers (2009) states that the 
change-over to private governance is due to government and nation states decreasing funds 
intended for regulation efforts, the inability of nation states to effectively regulate transnational 
corporations, and deterritorialization caused by globalization.  
 Certifications as transnational private governance link actors—from certification boards 
to the on-the-ground locals and their resources experiencing the effects of certified forestry 
enterprises. The transnational forestry certification regime has the power to shape discussions 
about how forests should be utilized; however, Schepers (2009) argues that nation states can 
easily override these discussions by challenging them. Schepers (2009) further states that those 
countries with large timber industries are influential in shaping the international expectations of 
businesses through their negotiating power and ability to challenge the rule-making process. The 
state is responsible for allowing access to certification schemes and other transnational CSR 
initiatives. If the state challenges these perspectives, businesses will have to evolve and change 
to fit into the countries they intend to serve. This points to certification being indicative not of 
decreased government involvement, but rather a mix of public-private governance relations and 
instances of transnational private governance (Schepers 2009, Ulybina 2010, Bartley 2014).  
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CSR and Certification in Russia  
 Since privatization, Russia’s forestry enterprises have sought environmental certification 
for their timber and lumber products. These certification schemes are developed at a 
transnational level and disseminated and promoted by environmental non-governmental 
organizations. During the transition period, environmental NGOs found the Russian forestry 
sector—comprised mostly of rural communities that were unfamiliar with non-state 
governance—especially difficult to work with (Tysiachniouk and Henry 2015). In 1998, WWF 
and Greenpeace began to promote the idea of forest certification. Russia was slow to take up 
such certification schemes, in spite of its recent history of socially responsible business (unlike 
other BRICS).  Certification was met with scrutiny and suspicion from industry, not only for 
being ‘foreign’, but also for being unrelatable. Meanwhile, the state remained suspicious of 
certification, as it seemed incompatible with established forestry management practices. There 
was little feedback from forestry settlement denizens and forestry workers or enterprise 
involvement, especially in the region of Karelia’s forestry sector which had in the past (1995-
2006) been the subject of multi-organization-led boycotts for harvesting high concentration value 
forests (Tysiachniouk and Henry 2015). Russia has a difficult relationship with non-
governmental agencies and this has been amplified recently with Putin’s “foreign agents” 
legislation. NGOs that receive funds from international means are suspected of promoting a 
foreign and hidden agenda regarding the Russian economy (Henry 2010).   Indeed, in Karelia, 
companies until recently have been penalized by the Russian state for following certification 
standards of biodiversity, and have instead found themselves marking certain forested areas as 
‘unexploitable’ versus facing consequences from the state or their certifier for their logging 
practices (Keskitalo et al 2009)(Tulaeva 2014).  
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 The enrollment of several large forestry enterprises has promoted the use of certifications, 
with more than 300 different types of forestry enterprises in Russia certified as of 2012 (Ulybina 
and Fennell 2012). Tysiachniouk and Henry (2015) remark that one of the obstacles to NGOs 
“winning over” the Federal Forestry Service has been the vagueness of forestry legislation and 
the level of involvement expected. However, certification is a financial investment and the 
process is particularly arduous, meaning that most enterprises have to work with NGOs to 
complete the necessary paperwork. This is largely the reason enterprises have preferred the 
“chain of custody certification” which allows for less paperwork and less accountability than 
full-fledged enterprise certification (Nysten-Haarala 2013). 
 While globally more prevalent, the PEFC (Programme for the Endorsement of Forestry 
Certification) is not as widely used in Russia as FSC. The PEFC scheme champions biodiversity, 
low usage of pesticides, and abolishes GMOs. It, like the FSC, is a non-profit made up of various 
international stakeholders. The PEFC is stationed in Switzerland and governed by a general 
assembly, board, and secretary general. However, the scheme lacks a stringent social 
responsibility aspect. It focuses instead on indigenous rights to forestland. The most popular 
certification scheme in Russia currently is the Forest Stewardship Counsel (FSC). FSC is 
considered less strict than some competing certification schemes, PEFC included, and is less 
antagonistic to Russian legislation (Tysiachniouk and Henry 2015, Keskitalo et al 2009, 
Kotilainen et al 2005) For Russian enterprises, the “social” aspects of FSC certification have 
tended to be negotiable (Keskitalo et al 2009). While the FSC is less antagonistic to Russian 
domestic policy than PEFC, there are instances of certification overriding Russian legislation and 
policy. These instances are usually social (although in some cases they concern actual forestry 
care, specifically biodiversity). Forestry enterprises in Russia discuss terms with local forest 
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authorities when certification standards infringe on legislation. An example of this is the 
recognized status of the Karelian Pomor people. Russian legislation does not allow Pomors 
protected indigenous status, while FSC does (Matilainen 2013, Nysten-Haarala 2013). 
Negotiation and informal networks are common in Russian business, however, international 
companies have found the process uncomfortable. These negotiated requirements are therefore 
more stringently followed by transnational corporations than their Russian counterparts who 
have already accumulated social capital (Nysten-Haarala 2013). Informal networks make 
domestic enterprises better able to negotiate and navigate their requirements, they in turn are less 
afraid of the consequences that come with negating or not following-through with the intricacies 
of their casual contracts.  
  Certification allows for a certain level of protection, as certified enterprises are less 
likely to be boycotted or “named-and-shamed” by environmental NGOs. The consumer- and 
NGO-led boycott of more than five organizations including: Greenpeace, SPOK, Taiga Rescue 
Network, and the Socio-Ecological Union shunning forestry products from the Republic of 
Karelia was effective enough to cause serious concern within the Karelian forestry sector. 
Smaller and medium sized operations are now more likely to acquire certification, if only for the 
ability to stave off boycotts or economic pressures from the market. After extensive campaigning 
by environmental NGOs, certification as a form of CSR has become an international norm; as a 
result, it has become imperative that Russian industries follow suit if they are to remain 
competitive in a globalized market. As a result, following the Forest Code of 2007 the Federal 
Forestry Service now expects forestry companies to be certified in order to be eligible for 
auctioned short-term user rights and leases (Ulybina and Fennell 2012, Keskitalo et al 2009).  
 The Forestry Code 2007 did not discuss biodiversity in any depth, and as a result, 
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companies have been at a loss regarding what strategies to employ. As of 2012, the FSC takes 
the position that certification and agreement are the only means of ensuring the responsible use 
of old-growth-forests in Russia (Forest-Karelia 2012).  However, a 2016 study in the Republic of 
Karelia did not find a marked difference in sustainability between those enterprises that were 
certified versus those that were not (Forest-Karelia 2016). This is partially due to some instances 
where sustainable practices are also the most economically advantageous, such as partial felling 
(a process of consciously cutting timber in a way that allows shelter for regeneration purposes 
and maintaining uneven-aged stands) (Ulybina and Fennell 2012). Non-certified enterprises 
could well be employing sustainable practices without directly intending to do so.  It is not yet 
clear that the certification process has any real impact on biodiversity and the preservation of 
ecosystems. 
 The social impact of certification has been more significant, as the process directly 
involves local actors in areas which, historically, have had weak social and civil engagement, 
and have often been involved in conflicts with forestry enterprises. These conflicts can occur 
over ideological questions—should we value conservation and preservation over sustainable 
resource extraction? What role should enterprise play in a community?—or over the direct 
impact of forestry and logging on local communities. According to Ulybina (2010), as of 2007 
there were nearly 70 leaseholders of varying sizes in the Republic of Karelia. Logging can take 
place within a kilometer of a village, meaning enterprises can easily infringe on vital community 
practices, such as berry picking, firewood procurement, and mushroom hunting. These practices 
are not only necessary for community vitality but also for livelihoods and economic security 
(Keskitalo et al 2009).  In the early 2000’s, the Republic of Karelia faced a large increase in 
leased forestland which created a competitive market for firewood, devastating the local 
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community (Tysiachniouk and McDermott 2015). The certification process has helped resolve 
conflicts like these by opening up lines of communication between enterprises and their local 
communities, as the following example will show. 
 In 2006, the Republic of Karelia’s Investlesprom embarked upon the certification 
process, and was expected to identify key members of the surrounding community for input on 
social values. The FSC certification process requires forestry enterprises to engage productively 
with their local communities, and to consult carefully to discover the sorts of engagement and 
investment they may need. The local communities remain the least significant stakeholders in 
forestry enterprises; however, the process of certification ensures that their voices are heard.  
 Supported by the FSC and a Russian NGO, the Centre for Independent Social Research 
(CISR), Investlesprom started investing in the public through small grants, which were utilized 
for folk festivals, local initiatives, and a museum. They also implemented a social fund which 
allocated money for community development based on the amount of hectares leased, and 
provided the community with reasonably priced firewood (Tysiachniouk and Henry 2015). These 
operations eventually ceased, but they had the lasting effect of creating and strengthening ties 
between community and enterprise. Locals were empowered to communicate and assert their 
needs—particularly helpful in cases of conflict resolution—and gained a level of agency which 
they had not had prior to Investlesprom’s social engagement program (Tysiachniouk and 
McDermott 2015, Tysiachniouk and Henry 2015). Any ANT-influenced analysis must, however, 
exercise caution when talking about the social. The social is not a monolith; as Latour warns us, 
we must not take the term to "designate a domain of reality or some particular item”—it is not 
something solid and empirically measurable, but rather “a movement, a displacement, a 
transformation, a translation, an enrollment… a type of momentary association which is 
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characterized by the way it gathers together into new shapes” (Latour 2005, 65-5). The word 
'social', then, can represent a shifting array of things that are also shifting, and whose needs may 
at times be at odds with one another. The process of association is not founded in anything solid 
or permanent: even the connections between actors in a network are subject to change. “Relating 
to one group or another is an on-going process made up of uncertain, fragile, controversial, and 
ever-shifting ties.” (Latour 2005, 28) If any social programs are to be successful, they require 
continual consultation and communication with the recipient communities to ensure that needs, 
wishes, and values are being met and respected. A community is not a homogenous entity, as we 
have seen; it is, instead, a sort of social ecosystem, and one that requires the same careful 
attention as do environmental ecosystems. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 The privatization of the forestry industry has had numerous effects on dependent 
communities. The abrupt cessation of the previous paternalistic relationship between enterprise 
and village has led to some villages struggling for survival. The previous structure of state 
forestry management had allowed for some infrastructure and community engagement, but with 
the new reforms and the increasing number of larger lumber companies with transnational ties, it 
is unlikely that forestry villages as they were known will continue to survive. The social aspects 
of certification help alleviate some of the grievances by instating new forms of governance. 
Although these services are market-driven, they are seemingly effective means of promoting and 
centering the social welfare of forestry communities. In the case of some settlements in the 
Republic of Karelia, municipalities are still not strong enough to enforce top-down initiatives or 
to construct and complete necessary infrastructure (Nysten-Haarala 2013). 
 The actors and networks have changed dramatically since the shift to privatization, but 
also since the ascent of certification. Forestry enterprises had looked to remove themselves from 
their communities, sometimes even bringing in foreign and remote logging contractors as 
opposed to hiring locally (Ulybina and Fennell 2012). The demands of providing infrastructure 
and ensuring community welfare were considered incompatible with economic progress. 
Networks between forestry enterprises and communities were strained, and in some cases 
severed completely. Forestry villages were expected to develop new relationships with and 
expectations of their municipalities, but this proved problematic due to lack of experience and of 
monetary funds. However, both enterprise and municipalities continue to rely upon the network 
of the forest for sustenance.  
 The Forestry Code of 2007, and the subsequent changeover to auction-only (versus the 
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leasing regulations and options of the 90’s) securing of natural resources, has seen a further shift 
in the connections. The loss of the leskhoz has been exacerbated by the switch to auctions. The 
2007 Code’s stipulation that leases and user-rights are guaranteed through auction further dilutes 
the relationships between forestry enterprises, the forestland, and the community. This strictly 
monetary method of obtaining land usage effectively absolves the enterprise from any social 
responsibility (Ulybina and Fennell 2012)--a situation which has caused citizens in the Republic 
of Karelia some concern regarding their ongoing claim to uses of the forest. Despite land being 
federal property, enterprises who have leased land do not always recognize the right of the 
community’s continued use for sustenance (Ivanova 2014). The “social component” of 
certification allows for these problems to be identified and foregrounded. As companies become 
increasingly dependent on the certification process, both to procure resources and to market their 
products, the constraints that have been placed upon forestry communities are more likely to 
undergo Latour and Callon’s previously discussed process of translation. Their dependence on 
the forestlands may offer them a means of being heard, and recognized; of no longer being 
forced into the background. While there is some concern that the citizens of forestry settlements 
are becoming further removed from their surrounding forestland, with technology and 
certification practices they are now able to become transnational actors (Latour 2005). The 
direction towards governance in a transnational sphere means that forestry communities can 
claim a voice in the global community, directing certification efforts both globally and locally. 
The Russian negotiation tactics used in business and navigating forest certification could very 
well gain traction in how other actors evaluate the certification process. As Russia holds nearly 
23% of the world’s forest resources, its voice is influential in the discourse surrounding forestry 
certification and practices (Shvidenko and Nilsson 2003). For local communities conflict 
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resolution and communication have been the most advantageous outcomes of the introduction of 
certification processes. Communities who are better acquainted with the practices of forestry 
enterprises and NGOs can better harness the process of translation, through naming and 
categorizing the problems, and identifying suitable actors necessary for resolution. Forestry 
enterprises have also now become more apt to ask NGOs for input regarding certification, 
sustainable practices, and social responsibility.  
 The community consultation element of the certification process may be the key to its 
success in preserving these social ecosystems. By listening carefully to the specific needs of 
communities, the certification process enables them to come forward and to become actors in an 
emergent -transnational- overwhelmingly corporate network that often silences or backgrounds 
local communities—after all, their contribution to the forestry network is neither directly 
material nor directly economic. Ironically, certification protocols set up ostensibly to ensure 
sustainable use of non-human ecosystems may have instead facilitated the protection of human 
ecosystems through social responsibility clauses. But, as all things are interacting, and may at 
any point shift or reconfigure, this may yet prove to be a catalyst for real, sustainable change in 
the forests of Karelia. 
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